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INTRODUCTION
In 1919, in the landmark corporate law case of Dodge v. Ford
Motors Co.,1 the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[a] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders” and that “the powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end.”2 This “traditionalist” holding was in line with
all of the states’ interpretations of corporate law and was part of the
“property” conception of the corporation, which was the prevailing
interpretation of the corporate model in the United States at the turn
of the twentieth century.3 However, since 1919, states have begun to
acknowledge both the social advantages of considering the well-being
of constituents other than shareholders in the corporate decisionmaking process and the inefficiencies that can result when corporate
boards are forced to make decisions based solely on profit
maximization.4
Acknowledging these twin advantages has led many states to
pass constituency statutes and other socially progressive corporate
legislation that allow for-profit corporations to account for the impact
a particular business decision will have on those with non-ownership
interests in the company.5 Of course, these statutes do not change the
fundamental goals of corporations to make a profit and to provide
their shareholders with high investment returns; instead, these
statutes simply acknowledge that investors are not the only parties
affected by the corporation’s business dealings. Thus, constituency
statutes allow directors to make decisions based on goals other than
maximizing shareholder profits.6
This Comment will discuss the many advantages of adopting
constituency statutes and benefit corporation acts and will advocate
for North Carolina’s adoption of a new conception of the corporation.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the rationale behind
1. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
2. Id. at 684.
3. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-11075, 2001 WL
1885686, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (quoting William T. Allen, Our
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65
(1992) (discussing the traditional “property” conception of the corporation that views a
corporation as “the private property of its stockholder-owners” whose “purpose is to
advance the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their wealth)” and
whose directors’ function “is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners”)).
4. See discussion infra Sections I.E, II.C.
5. See Nathan E. Standley, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the
Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 209 (2012).
6. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1102 (2000).
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constituency statutes, examines different constituency statutes in
existence today, and explains why the benefits of constituency
statutes far outweigh their drawbacks. Part II introduces the other
major type of socially progressive corporate legislation: benefit
corporation acts. This Part highlights the main advantages of the new
type of business organization those acts allow. Part III considers
several North Carolina cases that have dealt with the corporateconception conflict and discusses the North Carolina legislature’s
recent failed attempt to allow benefit corporations in the state.
Finally, Part IV advocates for North Carolina’s ratification of a
benefit corporation act and argues that the state should supplement
this act with a permissive constituency statute applicable to all nonbenefit corporations.
I. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
A. Historical Background and Development of Constituency Statutes
Although the conflict over how to interpret corporate theory
dates back to the nineteenth century, it was not until the 1930s that
the debate garnered national attention.7 At the forefront of this legal
debate were two prominent Ivy League law professors, Adolf Berle of
Columbia Law School and Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School.8
The two professors had fundamentally different views on the general
purpose of the corporation and the accompanying duties that the
directors of a corporation owed to a corporation’s shareholders.9
Berle strongly believed that a corporation was to be viewed as
the property of those with ownership interests in it and that the
directors of a corporation owed shareholders a fiduciary duty to
secure for them the highest possible return on their investment.10
Berle’s approach, known as the “traditionalist” theory, “urged the
primacy of shareholder interests” and concluded that the structure of
a corporation demanded that the board focus exclusively on
increasing shareholder wealth.11 In Berle’s mind, consideration of
nonshareholder interests was a direct conflict of interest and

7. Id. at 1090.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10 Id. (“Berle and other traditionalists urged primacy of shareholder interests
because shareholders are traditionally the parties to which directors and officers owe a
fiduciary duty to return their initial investment.”).
11. Id.
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constituted a breach of a director’s fiduciary duties.12 Berle’s
traditionalist theory would eventually evolve into the modern day
“shareholder primacy” model, which adheres to the notion that the
“best interests of the corporation [are] synonymous with [the] best
interests of the shareholders” even when the maximization of such
interest is to the detriment of other constituents’ wellbeing.13
On the other hand, Dodd advocated for the “constructionist
theory,” which “urged consideration of the interests of various
corporate
constituents,
including
both shareholders
and
stakeholders.”14 According to the constructionist theory, a
corporation is not merely the property of its shareholders but is a
community entity that “consists of many individuals with a stake in
the firm’s welfare.”15 Among the nonshareholder constituents that
Dodd identified were “employees, suppliers, and creditors, and the
general public.”16 Because constructionists do not view a corporation
as the property of its shareholders, they do not interpret the
corporate model as imposing an absolute obligation on its directors to
maximize shareholder profits when doing so would harm other
stakeholders.17
The debate between the traditionalists and constructionists
peaked in the 1980s as the corporate world experienced a wave of
hostile takeovers.18 These hostile takeovers presented dilemmas for
the boards of target companies, who were faced with a conflict
between shareholders’ short-term interests in profit maximization and
the best long-term interests of the corporation.19 Although the boards
12. Id. (“Because a conflict of interest arises when directors and officers consider
interests other than those of shareholders, the traditionalist viewpoint demands that only
one group’s interests—the shareholders—constitute the focus of director
decisionmaking.”).
13. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 90 (1992). Constituents affected by the shareholder primacy
model include groups like employees, creditors, suppliers, vendors, and the surrounding
community at large, all of whom are affected by a corporation’s actions despite the fact
that they are not necessarily financially invested in the company. Adams & Matheson,
supra note 6, at 1105.
14. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1090.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Standley, supra note 5, at 211; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and Implications, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 51, 53
(1991), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/takeovers_60s_80s.pdf [http://perma.cc
/C2L5-QUGA] (“Of the 1980 Fortune 500 companies, at least 143, or 28 percent, were
acquired by 1989.”).
19. Thomas J. Bamonte, The Meaning of the “Corporate Constituency” Provision of
the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1995).
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were technically required to allow the mergers under the traditionalist
corporate theory (because doing so would produce the highest profit
for stakeholders), in many cases directors feared that allowing
mergers would be detrimental to the corporation’s vested long-term
interests.20
With these potential consequences in mind, directors of target
corporations were left “scrambling to find ways to fend off hostile
bidders without breaching the fiduciary duties they owed to
shareholders.”21 These pressures forced incumbent directors of many
large takeover target companies, wary of their rapidly diminishing job
stability, to turn to state legislatures for help.22 State legislatures
responded by expediting formidable anti-takeover legislation
packages meant to equip directors with the necessary tools to resist
impending hostile takeovers.23 At the forefront of many of these
director-friendly packages were corporate constituency statutes.24
In 1983, Pennsylvania enacted the first corporate constituency
statute.25 At the time the bill was being considered, two of
Pennsylvania’s major corporations, Scott Paper Company and Gulf
Oil Corporation, each faced a potential hostile takeover and a proxy
contest.26 The companies leveraged the state legislature by
threatening to move elsewhere if the corporate constituency
legislation was not passed—pressure that likely played a role in the
statute’s expedited ratification.27 However, the statute’s passage was
also part of a broader, concerted effort to protect the state economy
and labor force by offering an array of laws and takeover defense

20. See id. at 3–4 (explaining that a corporation’s “long-term interests include the
interests of labor, creditors, suppliers, and other local community ‘constituents’ integral to
the success of the corporation”).
21. Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 781
(2009).
22. See Bamonte, supra note 19, at 7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sarah S. Nickerson, Comment, The Sale of Conrail: Pennsylvania’s Anti-Takeover
Statutes Versus Shareholder Interests, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1998); Standley, supra
note 5, at 212.
26. Nickerson, supra note 25, at 1372–73. Also known as a proxy fight, a proxy contest
is “[a] struggle between two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted
shareholders” that “[usually] occurs when a group of dissident shareholders mounts a
battle against the corporation’s [current] managers.” Proxy Contest, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
27. See Nickerson, supra note 25, at 1372–73.
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mechanisms that would encourage corporations to remain in
Pennsylvania.28
Many other states have since followed suit by passing their own
corporate-friendly
constituency
statutes
modeled
after
Pennsylvania’s.29 Forty-one states currently have some form of a
constituency statute.30 Though these statutes vary in form and scope,
“the unifying principle common to all constituency statutes is that
they enable corporate directors to consider interests other than those
of their shareholders when exercising their corporate decision-making
authority.”31 A constituency statute often contains the provisions such
as:
1. The board of directors of a corporation may consider the
interests and effects of any action upon nonshareholders.
2. The relevant nonshareholder groups include employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors, and communities.
3. The directors may consider both long-term and short-term
interests of the corporation.
4. The directors may consider local and national economies.
5. The directors may consider any other relevant social
factors.32
Though interpretation and application of these constituency
statutes has sometimes caused debate among legal scholars, there are
four commonly agreed-upon principles for the interpretation of
constituency statutes: (1) the statutes are permissive; they allow
directors to consider the interests of constituents other than
shareholders, but do not require them to do so; (2) the statutes
emphasize serving the best interests of the corporation rather than
shareholder wealth maximization; (3) the majority of the statutes
apply regardless of whether times are calm or the corporation finds
itself in the midst of a takeover attempt, when corporate control is at
stake; and (4) the statutes fail to expressly vest any legally
enforceable rights or remedies in nonshareholder constituents, and
28. See id. at 1373.
29. Orts, supra note 13, at 27.
30. Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder
Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 (2003); Standley, supra note 5, at 212.
31. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 781–82.
32. Id. at 782 (citing various state constituency statutes).
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thus, the nonshareholder constituents have no means of legal redress
if directors seemingly fail to consider their interests when making a
particular business decision.33 Aside from these core elements,
legislatures have tailored the statutes’ terms and scope to satisfy the
particular state’s objectives.34
B.

Types of Constituency Statutes

All constituency statutes can be categorized as one of four
distinct types.35 The first category is a permissive statute that covers
all corporate decisions.36 Pennsylvania’s statute serves as a good
example; its key provisions read as follows:
(a) General rule.--In discharging the duties of their respective
positions, the board of directors, committees of the board and
individual directors of a business corporation may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to the
extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected
by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon
communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that
these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and
potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the
corporation.
(4) All other pertinent factors.37
The Pennsylvania statute is permissive because it permits but does
not require directors of Pennsylvania corporations to consider the
effect a decision would have on nonshareholders.38 The term “may”
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Bamonte, supra note 19, at 7.
See Standley, supra note 5, at 213.
Id.
Id.
15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (West 2015).
See id. (using a permissive “may” rather than a mandatory “shall”).
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indicates legislative intent to permit boards of directors to consider
other constituents at their discretion without requiring them to do so
for every business decision.39 Furthermore, the absence of language to
the contrary indicates that the statute was meant to apply to all
business decisions, not just those relating to hostile takeovers.40 This
type of constituency statute is therefore the broadest in its application
and allows for the maximum amount of director discretion.41
The second type of constituency statute, like Illinois’s, takes a
different approach to the constituency problem. Rather than merely
empowering corporate boards to take nonshareholders into
consideration, this type of statute actually declares that a
corporation’s interests, which include the interests of a corporation’s
subsidiaries, should take priority over individual shareholders’
interests.42 Illinois’s statute reads as follows:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board
of directors, committees of the board, individual directors and
individual officers may, in considering the best long term and
short term interests of the corporation, consider the effects of
any action (including without limitation, action which may
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of
the corporation) upon employees, suppliers and customers of
the corporation or its subsidiaries, communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation or its subsidiaries are
located, and all other pertinent factors.43
This type of statute clearly establishes that it is not a
corporation’s shareholders to whom the directors owe a primary
fiduciary duty.44 In doing so, the statute rejects the shareholder
primacy approach, instead providing that the directors owe a primary
duty to promote the well-being of all “pertinent” stakeholders
involved by acting in the best interest of the corporation as a whole.45
39. See Standley, supra note 5, at 213–14 (characterizing the language of the
Pennsylvania statute as “permissive, not mandatory”).
40. Id.
41. See In re Total Containment, Inc., 335 B.R. 589, 606 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005)
(holding that a corporation’s directors will be protected by the business judgment rule so
long as they have not acted in “fraud, bad faith, or self-interest”). “The business judgment
rule is a judicially created doctrine that protects directors from personal civil liability for
the decisions they make on behalf of a corporation.” Lori McMillan, The Business
Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 521 (2013).
42. Standley, supra note 5, at 213.
43. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (LEXIS through Pub. Act 99-220 of the 2015
Leg. Sess.).
44. Standley, supra note 5, at 214.
45. Bamonte, supra note 19, at 8.
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By allowing Illinois directors to view the corporation as a community
entity, instead of as the property of corporate shareholders, the
legislature adopted the constructionist theory of corporate
conceptualization, thus providing for the well-being of those
stakeholders who have made nonfinancial investments in the
company.46
The third type of constituency statute is a permissive statute that
only applies to decisions related to hostile takeovers.47 For example,
Oregon’s statute reads as follows:
When evaluating any offer of another party to make a tender or
exchange offer for any equity security of the corporation, or
any proposal to merge or consolidate the corporation with
another corporation or to purchase or otherwise acquire all or
substantially all the properties and assets of the corporation, the
directors of the corporation may, in determining what they
believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, give due
consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on
employees, customers and suppliers of the corporation and on
the communities and geographical areas in which the
corporation and its subsidiaries operate, the economy of the
state and nation, the long-term as well as short-term interests of
the corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility
that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation, and other relevant factors.48
This type of statute, which has also been adopted by several other
states,49 is similar to the first two types of constituency statutes in that
it is permissive. Yet, this type of statute is simultaneously unique
because it limits its permissive nature to decisions made by directors
in light of a potential hostile takeover.50 In fact, the Oregon
legislature further underscored this statutory limitation to hostile
46. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL
1885686, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (discussing the Illinois constituency statute,
which “specifically authorize[s] directors to consider the interests of corporate constituents
other than shareholders when responding to a hostile takeover, . . . adjust[ing] the balance
of power between shareholders and other corporate constituents”).
47. Standley, supra note 5, at 213. A hostile takeover is “[t]he acquisition of
ownership or control of a corporation,” which is “typically accomplished by the purchase
of shares or assets, a tender offer, or a merger,” and “is resisted by the target corporation.”
Hostile Takeover, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
49. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347
(West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-5.2-8 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4
(2015).
50. See Standley, supra note 5, at 215.

94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016)

2015]

CORPORATE IDENTITY THEORY

695

takeover contexts by rejecting a house bill that proposed the statute’s
expansion to all corporate decisions in 2009.51 Because a wave of
hostile takeovers brought these constituent-interest issues to light and
prompted states to begin enacting constituency statutes in the first
place, states enacting these types of constituency statutes tend to limit
their statutes to hostile takeover situations.52 Although these statutes
stringently protect the interests of most stakeholders, they often fail
to provide for community and environmental interests, which can be
affected more by day-to-day decisions than by decisions made in
response to hostile takeover attempts.53
The final type of constituency statute is a formally mandatory
statute.54 Connecticut was the only state to enact this type of statute,
but even the Connecticut statute was amended in 2010 and is now
permissive.55 Prior to the 2010 amendment, the relevant portion of the
Connecticut statute read as follows:
(d) For purposes of sections 33-817, 33-830, 33-831, 33-841 and
33-844, a director of a corporation . . . shall consider, in
determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the
short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the
shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the
possibility that those interests may be best served by the

51. H.R. 2829, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); see also Standley, supra
note 5, at 215.
52. See Standley, supra note 5, at 215.
53. By limiting the scope of the constituency statute to hostile takeover situations, the
harmful environmental effects of a daily practice like toxic dumping may be ignored for the
sake of shareholder profit maximization. Cf. Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s
Guide To Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491, 503 (2009) (“To become a little
greener, a jurisdiction without an other constituency statute should adopt one, and a
jurisdiction with an other constituency statute limited to takeover situations should remove
the limitation.”). For example, Siltronic Corporation, a semiconductor-related manufacturer
located in Portland, Oregon, discharged 350,562 pounds of chemicals into the Willamette
River in 2012, accounting for over twenty-five percent of the state’s toxic chemical dumping
that year. Edward Russo, Siltronic Plant in Portland Dumps the Most Toxics into Oregon
Rivers, PORTLAND TRIB. (June 20, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/sl/22491487113-siltronic-plant-in-portland-dumps-the-most-toxics-into-oregon-rivers [http://perma.cc
/P35Z-AXAE]. While this method of waste disposal is likely a cost-efficient one, it fails to
consider the detrimental effect that such a practice will inevitably have on the
environment and the surrounding community. Cf. Benita M. Beamon, Designing the
Green Supply Chain, 12 LOGISTICS INFO. MGMT. 332, 341 (1999) (“No longer is it
acceptable or cost effective to consider only the local and immediate effects of products
and processes; it is now imperative to analyze the entire life-cycle effects of all products
and processes.”).
54. See Standley, supra note 5, at 213.
55. Id. at 216.
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continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of
the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors and
suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations
including those of any community in which any office or other
facility of the corporation is located. A director may also in his
discretion consider any other factors he reasonably considers
appropriate in determining what he reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation.56
Under this type of statute, most legal scholars interpreted the word
“shall” to mean that directors were required, and not merely allowed,
to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents that the
director “reasonably considers appropriate” when making corporate
decisions.57 Even under this mandatory form, Connecticut’s statute,
like all other constituency statutes examined in this Part, lacked an
enforcement mechanism for nonshareholders who wished to protect
their interests in a legal proceeding.58 Accordingly, even if the statute
was intended to be mandatory, the absence of an enforcement
mechanism or legal remedy for constituents immunized directors
from liability for failure to abide by the statute, thus nullifying the
very mandate upon which the statute was premised.59 Regardless, the
Connecticut legislature amended the statute in 2010 by replacing the
mandatory “shall” with a permissive “may.”60 In doing so, the
legislature eliminated the only purportedly mandatory constituency
statute in existence and ended the debate over enforcement of such a
statute before the courts ever addressed the issue.61 The failure of this
mandatory statutory construction provides important lessons and
instructive historical context as North Carolina considers adopting its
own constituency statute.
To date, there are still nine states, including North Carolina, that
have yet to enact any form of a constituency statute.62 Legal scholars
have proposed two theories as to why these states have not yet
adopted statutes: (1) “with the exception of Delaware, [the states that

56. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015) (emphasis added).
57. Standley, supra note 5, at 216. Bisconti states that the statute seemed to be an
explicit challenge to the theory of shareholder primacy, which indicated to both courts and
directors “that the consideration of nonshareholder interests must be more than just an
afterthought.” Bisconti, supra note 21, at 798.
58. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 783.
59. See id.
60. Act of May 10, 2015, No. 10-35, § 10(d), 2010 Conn. Acts H.B. 5530 (Reg. Sess.)
(codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015)).
61. Standley, supra note 5, at 216.
62. Id. at 217.
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have not yet adopted constituency statutes] were not significantly
impacted by the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s”; and (2) states
that did not adopt the statutes may have felt that states that did adopt
statutes “were overreacting by taking unnecessary steps in the face of
hostile takeovers.”63 Thus, states that have not yet adopted these
statutes may consider waiting in order to observe the impact
constituency statutes have on the corporate landscape in states that
have adopted constituency statutes.
C.

Delaware’s Creation of a Quasi-Constituency Statute at Common
Law

Though nearly every state has attempted to protect corporate
constituents through action by the legislative branch, Delaware, by
contrast, created a similar doctrine through its judicial branch. While
Delaware is among the nine states that have not yet formally adopted
a constituency statute, the state’s corporate law precedent has been
interpreted as having instead created a common law, quasiconstituency statute.64 Delaware case law strikes a balance between
shareholders’ and nonshareholder constituents’ interests by “allowing
directors to consider the interests of others as long as there is some
reasonable connection to the long-term interests of the corporation
and shareholders.”65 This “quasi-constituency statute” was affirmed in
the landmark case of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.66
In Paramount Communications, the Supreme Court of Delaware
upheld the Time board’s decision to reject a highly profitable tender
offer by Paramount Communications in favor of a merger with
Warner Brothers.67 Even though the merger was significantly less
favorable to Time’s shareholders, Time’s directors felt that the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 219 (“[T]he Delaware judiciary has aligned its common law to primarily
conform to constituency statutes.”).
65. Id. at 222. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (holding that directors may consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents in
the face of a possible takeover and are not obligated to approve a combination simply
because it would result in short-term shareholder profits), with Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (holding that when a
takeover becomes inevitable (i.e. the “Revlon” moment occurs), directors may no longer
consider nonshareholder interests and are obligated to act as unbiased auctioneers in an
effort to maximize shareholder profits), and Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) (holding that, provided there is no inevitable impending
takeover, directors are free to make corporate decisions that may not necessarily
maximize short-term shareholder profits as long as the decision promotes the long-term
interests of both shareholders and the corporation in general).
66. 571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 (Del. 1990).
67. See id. at 1152–53.
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Warner deal would provide better long-term benefits for the
corporation.68 While the powerful precedent set by several of
Delaware’s constituency cases—and exemplified by Paramount
Communications—seems to be clear enough to settle the constituency
debate in Delaware, corporate directors in the other eight states
(including North Carolina) remain without explicit statutory law to
guide corporate governance. Because the case law in the area is
seemingly very limited, corporations in these eight states are left
guessing as to how a constituency case would play out in their own
state courts.
D. Responding to the Primary Arguments Against Constituency
Statutes
Despite the fact that forty-one states have already adopted
constituency statutes, many legal scholars who promote Berle’s
traditionalist theory still reject the constructionist-based laws,
claiming such statutes promote an improper conceptualization of the
corporate model. This Section will address some of the most common
criticisms of constituency statutes, including arguments that these
statutes are unconstitutional and claims that they offend public policy.
1. Constitutional Arguments Against Constituency Statutes
Critics of constituency statutes often attack them by challenging
their constitutionality.69 One constitutional argument against
constituency statutes is that they violate the Contracts Clause of the
United States Constitution.70 In order to understand this argument,
one must conceptualize the modern-day corporation as a “ ‘nexus of
contracts’ involving various constituents, including shareholders,
directors, managers, and employees.”71 Critics of constituency statutes
argue that, under this contract-based corporate theory, shareholder
interests are the “foremost aspect” and that “any state law impairing
these
previously
existing
contracts . . . must
be
declared
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.”72 However, a state’s
constituency statute only violates the Contracts Clause if it is proven

68. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at
109, 123–24 (2004).
69. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1096.
70. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (forbidding states from passing any “law
impairing the obligation of contracts”).
71. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1096.
72. Id.
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that the statute caused some loss of investment by retroactively
impairing an existing contractual relationship.73 Thus, because one
cannot assume that a corporation in a state governed by a
constituency statute produces any less profit than a corporation
operating in a state without a constituency statute, the Contracts
Clause argument seemingly lacks legal justification.74
Another constitutional argument against constituency statutes is
that the consideration of nonshareholders’ rights constitutes a
“taking,” and thus, a violation of the Fifth Amendment.75 Arguably,
considering the interests of other parties “constitutes a taking because
shareholders’ legal claim to the residual interest of the firm is reduced
by consideration of constituent interest, which reassigns property
rights from shareholders to stakeholders.”76 However, “constituency
statutes do not completely strip shareholders of the entire value of
their stock; they merely limit the preferential treatment of
shareholder interests.”77 Because legislation that merely “reallocates
benefits and burdens among private parties” is not considered a
taking under the Fifth Amendment, it follows that a claim that
constituency statutes violate the Fifth Amendment cannot be
sustained.78
2. Policy Arguments Against Constituency Statutes
Traditionalists have also made several public policy arguments
against constituency statutes. The first such argument is that state
legislatures only enacted constituency statutes because they were
pressured to do so by the powerful executives from the states’ largest
corporations.79 These executives petitioned for the new statutes out of
73. Id. at 1097.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
76. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1097. “Residual interest” refers to an
equity holder’s property rights in the corporation, which opponents of constituency
statutes argue are devalued by the consideration of additional constituents’ interests. Id.
77. Id. at 1098. In United States v. General Motors Corp., the Supreme Court made it
clear that whether an action constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment depends on
whether the action deprives the owner of the property, not whether it affects ancillary
interests associated with such property. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 378 (1945) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment concerns itself solely with the ‘property,’ i.e.,
with the owner’s relation as such to the physical thing and not with other collateral
interests which may be incident to his ownership.”).
78. Al Meyers, Whom May the Corporation Serve?—An Argument for the
Constitutionality of Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 449,
475–76 (1994).
79. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1099.
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fear that they would lose their jobs should the hostile takeovers of
their companies succeed.80 Critics argue that by submitting to this
political pressure, states that passed constituency statutes allowed
these same officers and directors to “hide behind the law when [their]
decisions are questioned, making the process one which benefits
managers instead of the constituents [the statutes] are meant to
serve.”81 However, while constituency statutes may have ultimately
resulted in such executives and directors being able to keep the highpaying positions that they would have lost had a merger succeeded,
the statutes were likely primarily driven by state legislatures’ desire
for large corporations to remain incorporated in, or even relocate to,
the state, thus bolstering the state’s labor force and serving its best
economic interests.82
Perhaps the most convincing policy argument against
constituency statutes is that they lack an enforcement mechanism for
the constituents they purport to protect.83 None of these statutes
provide any way for constituents to force directors to consider their
interests, nor do they allow constituents to challenge director
decisions that have a detrimental effect on them.84 In fact, some state
constituency statutes even go so far as to explicitly deny
nonshareholder constituents such a remedy.85 This means that
directors often have no choice but to prioritize stockholding
constituents’ interests to the exclusion of the interests of other
stakeholders because of the threat of potential legal action by the
shareholders, who, unlike nonshareholders, do maintain statutorily
enabled litigation options.86
Yet the reason constituency statutes lack enforcement rights is
likely because they are permissive, and not mandatory, in nature.87
Because constituency statutes merely give directors the option to
consider nonshareholder constituents’ interests, a court would be
hard-pressed to find a violation when those directors simply choose
not to exercise this option.88 Accordingly, states that have passed

80. See id.
81. Id. at 1100.
82. See, e.g., supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
83. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1110.
84. See id. at 1100–01.
85. Standley, supra note 5, at 218; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(6) (LEXIS through 2014 Spec. Sess.); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 717(b)(v) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015, chapters 1–558).
86. Standley, supra note 5, at 218.
87. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1101.
88. See id.
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constituency statutes have effectively done so with the hope that the
expansion of director capabilities will not be in vain. Because there is
no way nonshareholder constituents’ interests can be legally enforced,
the legislatures in states that have passed constituency statutes must
trust that directors will take it upon themselves to create socially
conscious corporate governance structures in which all stakeholders’
interests are considered.89 While this may be effective to a certain
extent, a mandatory constituency statute, such as the one this
Comment advocates for North Carolina to enact, will ensure more
consistent consideration of stakeholder interests.
E.

Arguments in Favor of Constituency Statutes Outweigh the
Criticisms

Several commentators have recognized the need to consider the
best interests of other important corporate constituents, advocating
the constructionist corporate model and highlighting the many
potential benefits of constituency statutes. These proponents
emphasize several policy arguments relating to the economic
efficiency and equitable corporate structure that constituency statutes
promote.90
First, constituency statutes allow directors to acknowledge the
importance of constituents who make essential but noncapital
investments in the company, and to consider their interests when
making business decisions.91 Though they may not have made
financial investments in the corporation, nonshareholder constituents,
like employees, “have made a much greater investment in the
enterprise by their years of service” and in many cases “may have a
greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the
stockholders.”92 Because these stakeholders lack the ability to protect
their noncapital investments in the firm contractually, they need
access to alternative protections to secure their interests.93

89. See id. at 1103.
90. See, e.g., id. at 1104 (“Constituency statutes allow consideration of those other
than shareholders who have contributed to a corporation’s success by allowing all
constituencies to influence the decisions of companies they help operate and depend on
for financial security.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 995 (1992) (“[D]irectors may balance a decision’s effects on
shareholders against its effect on stakeholders. If the decision would harm stakeholders,
the directors may trade-off a reduction in shareholder gains for enhanced stakeholder
welfare.”).
91. Adams and Matheson, supra note 6, at 1102.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1103–04.
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Constituency statutes allow directors to balance the concurrent
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, thus permitting the
directors to pursue a course of action that ultimately sacrifices a
portion of shareholder gains if doing so is necessary to protect the
noncapital interests of other constituents.94 Allowing directors to
conduct business in this way helps promote an environment within
the corporation in which all corporate actors feel “as if they share
common goals, rather than placing them in selfish competition with
one another.”95
The second argument in favor of constituency statutes is that
these statutes inspire socially responsible behavior and allow
corporations to uphold their ethical responsibilities, thereby
encouraging corporations that value these goals to incorporate in, or
relocate to, the state.96 The general idea is that these companies that
“do good for society” will also tend to “do well in the market,” thus
benefitting the state as a whole.97 Because constituency statutes are
meant to encourage socially responsible corporate behavior, such
statutes will help states attract ethically and socially responsible
businesses, which will lead to a more “attractive business climate” and
benefit the statewide economy.98
Legal scholars in favor of constituency statutes maintain that
corporations must become institutions with moral identities that
recognize and accept their ethical obligation to the many different
nonshareholder constituents who are integral to a corporation’s
success.99 In doing so, a corporation must account for the external
effects of its internal decisions by holding its directors to a high moral
standard and requiring them to consider all of the relevant interests at
stake when making a decision.100 Allowing directors to consider these
94. Bainbridge, supra note 90, at 995.
95. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 642–43 (1992) (“[Considering
stakeholder interests] helps redress the malaise caused by corporate displacement of those
in the process who have limited, if any, power to participate in or influence that process.”).
96. See Bisconti, supra note 21, at 786.
97. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 103 n.221 (2010)
(explaining that empirical studies have revealed a positive correlation between corporate
social performance and corporate financial performance); see also Marc Orlitzky,
Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 113, 127 (Andrew Crane
et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that corporate citizenship and corporate financial
performance are mutually reinforcing and positively correlated).
98. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 786.
99. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1108–09.
100. See id. at 1109.
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nonshareholder constituents’ interests helps foster positive relations
between a business and its community, which is important for both a
corporation’s financial success and the welfare of the general
public.101
Finally, constituency statutes are simply more consistent with the
modern theory of the corporation.102 According to proponents of
constituency statutes, modern corporate law has clearly rejected the
traditionalist theory that the corporation is the sole property of its
shareholders.103 Instead, modern corporate law views the corporation
as an interdependent system of personal and economic
relationships.104 Corporate structure is supported by a “web of
contracts, explicit and implicit, among a variety of participants:
stockholders, lenders, employees, managers, suppliers, distributors,
and customers.”105 Because all of these constituents bear some type of
residual risk, proponents of constituency statutes argue that directors
must make decisions based on what is best for society as a whole, not
just what is best for maximizing shareholder wealth.106
Taken together, the arguments in favor of constituency statutes
outweigh those against them. Though the statutes may have originally
been passed as anti-takeover devices, they have become mediums
through which corporations can make socially conscious decisions
that benefit those with financial and nonfinancial investments in the
company alike.107
II. BENEFIT CORPORATION ACTS: ANOTHER TYPE OF
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LEGISLATION
While permissive constituency statutes are the oldest and most
common type of progressive corporate legislation, more radical
corporate reforms have also recently taken shape. In the past five
years alone, a new type of corporate reform legislation has emerged

101. See id.
102. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 95, at 630 (“We have long since passed the point of
seriously describing the corporation as an anthropomorphic entity, directed in an
otherwise indeterminate world by the generalized interests of its ‘owners’ in wealth
maximization. It is obvious that the corporation is far more complex an undertaking,
consisting of intertwined human and economic relationships, than the traditional
stockholder-owner model permits.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1105 (quoting Morey W. McDaniel,
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 149 (1991)).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1109.
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and begun to catch on in many states: the benefit corporation act.108
Benefit corporation statutes were likely created in response to the
common criticism that the permissive nature of constituency statutes
often results in nonshareholder constituents’ interests being
ignored.109 By eliminating the permissive element of constituency
statutes, these more modern benefit corporation statutes have sought
to solve this problem and to assure that such interests are always
considered in a corporation’s decision-making process.110
A. What Is a Benefit Corporation?
Benefit corporations are a new type of business association
designed to address the inequity between shareholder and
stakeholder interests.111 Benefit corporations (1) strive to create a
corporate purpose that will have a positive impact on both society and
the environment; (2) are not simply permitted to, but are required to
consider the impact their business decisions will have on both
shareholders and all other nonshareholder constituents;112 and (3) are
required to release an annual report to the public assessing the
company’s overall social and environmental performance using an
objective third-party standard.113 While the ultimate goal of benefit
corporations is still to make money, this type of business association
enables “[c]ommunity and environmentally minded business owners
[to] preserve their social goals without sacrificing the ability to make a
profit.”114
Although benefit corporations can be viewed as an alternative to
constituency statutes and some states have chosen to implement
either one or the other, many states are beginning to enact benefit
108. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LEXIS
through 2015 legislation).
109. See James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits [https://perma.cc/9M3K
-VL8Z (dark archive)]. Benefit corporation acts require that directors of those companies
consider nonshareholder interests rather than simply giving them the option to do so. See
FAQ, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [http://perma.cc/3FA9-KT4R].
110. See Surowiecki, supra note 109.
111. See FAQ, supra note 109.
112. Id. This is the primary reason for having benefit corporations even in states that
already have constituency statutes. “Constituency statutes are permissive and as a result
directors ‘may’ consider non-financial interests. This also means that they ‘may not’. [sic.]
The objective of benefit corporation legislation is to require directors to consider nonfinancial interests.” Id.
113. Id.
114. Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 5,
2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefitcorporation/ [http://perma.cc/CFB8-9M2V].
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corporation legislation in addition to their pre-existing constituency
statutes.115 In fact, since Maryland became the first state to adopt a
benefit corporation act in 2010, twenty-five more states and the
District of Columbia have passed legislation allowing businesses to
incorporate as benefit corporations.116
Whereas the standard corporation is typically allowed to form
for any lawful purpose, companies organized as benefit corporations
must “have a purpose of creating ‘general public benefit’ and are
allowed to identify one or more ‘specific public benefit’ purposes.”117
For example, Maryland defines a “general public benefit” as a
“material, positive impact on society and the environment, as
measured by a third-party standard, through activities that promote a
combination of some specific public benefits.”118 “Specific public
benefit” is defined to include the following:
(1) Providing individuals or communities with beneficial
products or services;
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course
of business;
(3) Preserving the environment;
(4) Improving human health;
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
purpose; or
(7) The accomplishment of any other particular benefit for
society or the environment.119

115. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net
/policymakers/state-by-state-status [http://perma.cc/L2VK-KDAY]. To date, thirty-one states
have passed benefit corporation legislation and five others have introduced bills to adopt
similar legislation in their states. Id.
116. Jacob E. Hasler, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower
Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1279 & n.1 (2014).
117. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 839
(2012).
118. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (LEXIS through 2015
legislation).
119. § 5-6C-01(d).
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Now that the general structure of the benefit corporation has
been introduced, the next Section addresses the criticisms and
advantages most commonly associated with this novel corporate form.
B.

Addressing the Major Criticisms of Benefit Corporation Acts

Critics of benefit corporations point to three major drawbacks of
benefit corporation acts.120 First, organizing as a benefit corporation
leads to a significant increase in administrative costs because of the
heightened reporting requirements to which benefit corporations are
subjected.121 The relatively extensive reporting requirements are
exemplified by the Maryland Benefit Corporation Act, which requires
all benefit corporations to: (1) prepare an annual report assessing the
company’s societal and environmental performance over the past
year; (2) promptly deliver the report to each stockholder at the close
of the fiscal year; and (3) either post the most recent report on the
company’s publicly accessible website or provide a copy of the most
recent report on demand and without charge to any person who
requests it.122 The expenses associated with these reporting
requirements could be a deterrent for potential investors in a publicly
traded benefit corporation, particularly if the company is forced to
pass these administrative costs along to the shareholders in the form
of lower dividends.
Second, because benefit corporations have only been in existence
since 2010, another major concern is that the model has not yet
proven to be effective.123 Benefit corporations’ increased emphasis on
social responsibility and their somewhat decreased emphasis on
maximizing shareholder returns has critics wondering whether
investors will ultimately be willing to sacrifice a portion of their
would-be profits for the greater social good.124 Some experts argue

120. See Bend & King, supra note 114.
121. See id. (“One of the major drawbacks is expanded reporting requirements. This is
to provide shareholders with adequate information to determine if your business is
achieving its stated purpose. Each year a benefit corporation must give each shareholder
an annual report.”).
122. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08.
123. See Bend & King, supra note 114 (“Another potential drawback is uncertainty.
Benefit corporations are fairly new legal entities. It is unclear how courts will interpret
their mandates to not only seek profits, but also to consider potential benefits to society.
Furthermore, the impact on raising capital and how angel investors and venture capitalists
will react remains uncertain.”).
124. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A
Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 657 (2013)
(noting that many “investors are fully entrenched in the business and cultural norm
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that the mandatory general benefit purpose clause creates such a
concern in potential investors and that this concern may cause them
to invest in traditional business corporations instead.125 Specifically,
Justin Blount, a Professor of Business Law at Stephen F. Austin
University, and Kwabena Offei-Danso, an in-house corporate
attorney, have questioned the economic sustainability of benefit
corporations, stating that when
investors face the opportunity to invest in a benefit corporation
that articulates its primary purpose as the creation of a general
public benefit or, on the other hand, a socially minded business
corporation that embraces a profit goal via a socially
responsible business plan, the latter is more likely to receive
capital.126
Even those who advocate “socially responsible investments,”
such as companies incorporated as benefit corporations, concede that
many socially conscious investors still invest with the primary goal of
making a return.127 Thus, although this aspect of benefit corporations
suggests that most multi-billion dollar companies with extremely
wealthy institutional investors are unlikely to re-organize as benefit
corporations, the business form may be an attractive option for
companies with investors who are interested in turning a profit but
are also committed to investing in a company that places a premium
on social responsibility.
The last major criticism of benefit corporation acts is a
procedural one. Critics point out that although benefit corporations
require directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder
constituents, benefit corporation acts, like constituency statutes, fail
to provide these nonshareholder constituents with a mechanism to
enforce their rights.128 Legislatures in states with benefit corporation
acts have likely left such enforcement provisions out of their statutes
to avoid “the difficult and inefficient judicial problem that would
develop if the benefit corporation were subject to suit by any of the
stakeholders whose interests they are required to consider.”129
Because nonshareholder constituents are left without remedy, critics
believe the benefit corporation “falls short of being a true
commonly taught in business schools—that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize
shareholder wealth”).
125. Id. at 657–58.
126. Id. at 657.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 648–49.
129. Id. at 648.
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stakeholder-centric model” because the company cannot be held
accountable by the very parties the corporate form is meant to
protect.130 However, while the statutes do not provide nonshareholder
constituents with a right of enforcement, such a right is available to
shareholders, who may bring a claim against a benefit corporation’s
directors for failure to uphold the company’s stated general or
specific public benefit purposes.131 Furthermore, it seems likely that
those who would be willing to invest in benefit corporations would
also be inclined to hold such companies accountable and ensure that
nonshareholder constituents’ interests are properly considered.132
C.

Benefit Corporations’ Numerous Socioeconomic Advantages
Offset Their Potential Drawbacks

The first major advantage of benefit corporation acts is that they
require companies organized as benefit corporations to adhere to the
higher social standards created by their general and specific benefit
purposes, regardless of circumstances.133 A benefit corporation is able
to ensure it will uphold its beneficial purposes because directors are
afforded “secured legal protection necessary to consider the interests
of all stakeholders” and shareholders are provided with ample means
of enforcement.134 Shareholders may enforce director compliance in
several ways: They may (1) seek an injunction by initiating a benefit
enforcement proceeding; (2) engage in a proxy contest; and (3) vote
for terms in the entity’s governing documents that require routine
auditing of directors’ actions.135 Though similar means of enforcement
are available in the traditional corporation as well, social investors in
benefit corporations are much more likely to hold directors
accountable for a deviation from the company’s general or specific
beneficial purposes “because their stock purchase was conditioned on
a promise that directors would act in a socially responsible
manner.”136

130. Id. at 648–49.
131. Surowiecki, supra note 109 (“Shareholders can sue [a benefit corporation’s]
directors for not carrying out the company’s social mission, just as they can sue directors of
traditional companies for violating their fiduciary duty.”). See infra Section II.C for more
details on ways in which shareholders can ensure that benefit corporations operate
according to their stated beneficial purposes.
132. See Hasler, supra note 116, at 1319.
133. Surowiecki, supra note 109 (“Whereas a regular business can abandon altruistic
policies when times get tough, a benefit corporation can’t.”).
134. Id.
135. Hasler, supra note 116, at 1319.
136. Id.
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Another advantage of benefit corporation acts is that they
insulate directors of benefit corporations from investor pressure.137
Because shareholders are but one of the many constituent groups
whose interests must be considered by benefit corporations, directors
need not fear for their jobs every time they make a socially
responsible decision that may marginally decrease shareholder
profits; doing so is simply part of their fiduciary duty.138 This prevents
directors from being forced into solely monetary-based decisions. For
instance, in 2000, the Ben & Jerry’s board of directors strongly
opposed the acquisition of their company by Unilever from a social
standpoint but nonetheless felt bound by their fiduciary duty to the
shareholders to approve the acquisition.139 However, if Ben & Jerry’s
had been organized as a benefit corporation, the directors would not
have owed the shareholders any such duty. The directors would have
been free to oppose the combination for legitimate social reasons
despite the fact that doing so may have deprived the shareholders of
the highest possible profit.
The final advantage of benefit corporations is that they appeal to
young, talented employees who are part of an increasingly socially
conscious generation and who are seeking to start their careers at
companies with similar values.140 In fact many young employees are
even willing to “take less compensation in exchange for a greater
sense of purpose.”141 If benefit corporations are able to attract and
retain this type of top-tier talent, their efficiency will increase and
they will be able to stay true to their beneficial and charitable
purposes while still managing to turn a healthy profit.142
In sum, benefit corporations have become a popular alternative
for new and existing companies that do not wish to conform to the
traditionalist view of the corporation.143 By voluntarily holding
themselves to a higher social standard, these companies are able to
recognize the needs of all those whose interests the corporation
affects.144 This progressive business model in turn attracts qualified
young minds and socially conscious investors who support the
137. See Surowiecki, supra note 109.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. For example, see infra Section IV.A for a discussion of Patagonia, a recently
reorganized California benefit corporation that has managed to achieve financial success
while remaining true to its stated public benefit purposes.
144. See Surowiecki, supra note 109.
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company’s noble goals.145 The ultimate result can be a more efficient
company that is able to turn a healthy profit while making meaningful
societal contributions, satisfying all of its constituents.
III. HOW NORTH CAROLINA HAS DEALT WITH THE CORPORATE
THEORY CONFLICT
A. Lack of North Carolina Case Law on the Issue
Unlike Delaware, North Carolina case law does not create a
quasi-constituency statute or address the question of whether
nonshareholder constituents may be considered in a corporation’s
decision-making process.146 However, North Carolina courts have
acknowledged the existence and importance of the conflict between
different constituents’ interests, thus reinforcing the argument that
North Carolina could benefit from legislation that expressly defines
the scope of director discretion.147
In 1983, the Supreme Court of North Carolina handed down
perhaps the most definitive rule available on the corporate theory
conflict in the state. In Meiselman v. Meiselman,148 the court asserted
that directors of corporations, “[w]hile technically not
trustees . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders.”149 By conceptualizing directors as “quasi-trustees,” the
court seems to endorse the traditionalist, property-based theory of
corporate identity.150 The opinion suggests that the corporation is to
be viewed as the “property” of its investors and the directors, as
“quasi-trustees,” are to manage the business accordingly.151 Though
145. See id. (“Having a social mission can also be an important selling point with
consumers, as the success of the fair-trade movement makes clear.”). The fair-trade
movement is an international commercial trade initiative that seeks to reduce poverty and
increase sustainable development by securing rights for marginalized producers and
workers and creating more equitable trading conditions. WORLD FAIR TRADE ORG., A
CHARTER OF FAIR TRADE PRINCIPLES 2–7 (Jan. 2009), http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin
/user_upload/content/2009/about_us/documents/Fair_Trade_Charter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3T4-886U].
146. See Standley, supra note 5, at 217, 221–23.
147. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288–96, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557–61
(1983).
148. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
149. Id. at 308, 307 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
150. See generally id., 307 S.E.2d 551 (discussing the directors’ fiduciary duty to
shareholders of the company).
151. See id. at 308, 307 S.E.2d at 568 (“Corporate officers and directors are not
permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.
While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound
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the courts of several other states have disputed the ruling in this case,
Meiselman has yet to be overturned by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.152
In First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,153 the Superior
Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, identified the lack of
clarity in corporate identity theory as a major hindrance to effective
application of North Carolina corporate law.154 In doing so, the court
acknowledged that the two opposing theories of corporate identity
always have been, and will continue to be, at the root of most intracorporation conflict.155 Because corporations “exist to create value,”
and producing profits or creating nonfinancial, external gains can
create such value, it is important that directors have a clear sense of
how they are permitted to run a corporation and which values they
are permitted to foster.156
B.

North Carolina Legislature’s Rejection of the Benefit Corporation
Act

Perhaps in response to North Carolina courts expressing a need
for clarity as to the bounds of directors’ duties, the state’s general
assembly recently considered instituting a benefit corporation act.157
In February of 2013, the North Carolina Senate proposed and passed
a bill to ratify the North Carolina Benefit Corporation Act.158 The bill
was then promptly filed in the house of representatives and, after
being referred to several committees, was ultimately rejected by a

knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a
corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might
properly bring to it.” (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939))).
152. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland disagreed with this case in Lerner v.
Lerner Corp., 750 A.2d 709, 721–22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000), and several other states’
highest or intermediate appellate courts have declined to follow it.
153. No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001).
154. See id. at *1.
155. Id. at *2 (“Two inconsistent conceptions have dominated our thinking about
corporations since the evolution of the large integrated business corporation in the late
nineteenth century.”).
156. See id. at *1.
157. H.B. 440, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).
158. Legislative History of North Carolina Senate Bill 99: North Carolina Benefit
Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=S99 [http://perma.cc/R2DR-457E].
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count of sixty to fifty-two.159 The terms of the North Carolina Benefit
Corporation Act proposed by the bill were very similar to those in the
statutes of other states that allow benefit corporations.160 The Act
would have required that a business incorporated as a benefit
corporation “have as one of its corporate purposes the creation of a
general public benefit” and would have required the directors of
benefit corporations to consider the financial, social, and
environmental impact of a potential business decision.161
Though two Republican representatives sponsored the bill, the
vast majority of the Republicans in the house of representatives voted
against it.162 The “no” votes from the Republican majority were
ultimately enough to overcome the nearly unanimous Democratic
support of the bill.163 Those who opposed the bill were concerned that
“its goal [was] to move the corporate system and capitalism in general
toward socialism by suggesting that there’s a higher, better purpose
than maximizing profit.”164 However, the bill’s sponsor,
Representative McGrady (R-Henderson County), and other
supporters explained that there was no socialist agenda and that the
proposed act was simply meant to recognize the aspirations of the
socially conscious younger generation, who “want to make a profit,”
but also want to “be about good things.”165
C.

Possible Explanations for North Carolina’s Failure To Adopt
Either Type of Statute

There are several possible explanations for why North Carolina’s
General Assembly has not yet chosen to adopt either major type of
159. Id.; Laura Leslie, House Votes Down Benefit Corporations, WRAL: @NCCAPITOL
(May 14, 2013), http://www.wral.com/house-votes-down-benefit-corporations/12451435/
[http://perma.cc/X2HH-NJ7B].
160. See Leslie, supra note 159.
161. H.B. 440 § 55-18-30(a).
162. Roll-Call Transcript for May 15, 2013, Vote on North Carolina House Bill 440, N.C.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript
.pl?sSession=2013&sChamber=H&RCS=724 [http://perma.cc/9LXJ-XW7T].
163. Id. However, the vote was immediately reversed, and the resurrected bill has since
been sent to the House Committee on Commerce and Job Development for
reconsideration, with the possibility for it to be presented to the house again at a later
date. Leslie, supra note 159.
164. Leslie, supra note 159 (“Members also received a handout from free-market
think-tank Civitas Institute reinforcing that point.”). There was also some suggestion by
sponsor Rep. Chuck McGrady, a Republican from Henderson County, that many who
voted against the bill did so because they believed the bill promoted the United Nations’
“Agenda 21” sustainability efforts, which some conspiracy theorists allege is a socialist
plot. Id.
165. Id.
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progressive corporate law reform. The first is that, unlike many of the
states that rushed to adopt constituency statutes, North Carolina was
not significantly impacted by the 1980s wave of hostile takeovers that
sparked many other states to pass those statutes.166 This argument is
substantiated by both the general nature of the 1980s takeover trend
and the landscape of the North Carolina economy at the time.167 As
Harvard Economics Professor Andrei Shleifer and University of
Chicago Business Professor Robert Vishny explained in their article,
Takeovers in the ‘60s and the ‘80s: Evidence and Implications,168 the
takeover targets in the 1980s wave were generally much larger
corporations, such as Fortune 500 companies.169 In fact, twenty-eight
percent of the Fortune 500 companies of 1980 had been acquired by
hostile takeover by 1989.170 However during this period, North
Carolina was experiencing a complete economic overhaul.171 It was
not until the late 1980s that North Carolina’s economy began to shift
away from smaller companies engaged in the textile and farming
industries towards much larger companies in the financial and
technology-based industries.172
Thus, it is quite possible that the North Carolina General
Assembly was disinclined to follow the constituency statute trend that
began in the mid-1980s simply because the textile and agricultural
companies that made up a majority of the state’s economy were not
consistently targeted.173 However, the influx of large corporations in
the state since the late 1980s has led to a vastly different modern
economy that is no longer completely dependent upon such
industries.174 In fact, in 2013, North Carolina had the nation’s tenth
highest GDP.175 At the center of this growth is the city of Charlotte,
which has become the second-largest financial center in the country

166. See Standley, supra note 5, at 217.
167. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 53–55 (explaining the nature of 1980s
takeovers and the general state of the United States economy at the time).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 53.
170. Id.
171. North Carolina, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/North
_Carolina.aspx [http://perma.cc/PUS8-F393].
172. Id.
173. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 53 (noting that “the size of the average
[takeover] target increased enormously from the modest level of the ‘60s”).
174. See id. at 53–55.
175. News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Broad
Growth Across States in 2014: Advance 2014 and Revised 1997–2013 Statistics of GDP by
State (June 10, 2015), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2015/pdf/gsp0615
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JTE-QCTX].
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and is now home to many large corporate takeover targets.176 Though
it may not have made sense for North Carolina to adopt a
constituency statute in the 1980s, it is clear that the state’s corporate
landscape has seen significant change over the past thirty-five years,
and it is imperative that North Carolina revamp its corporate law to
better reflect this reality.
Another plausible explanation for North Carolina’s failure to
adopt either a constituency statute or a benefit corporation act is that
the general assembly is wary of the effect the statutes may have and
“want[s] to observe the impact” of constituency statutes and benefit
corporation acts in other states.177 Regarding constituency statutes in
particular, North Carolina may have felt that other states were
“overreacting” by desperately expediting the constituency statutes in
the face of the 1980s hostile takeover wave.178 If the general assembly
felt the state could survive the wave of takeovers without passing a
constituency statute, it would have been to North Carolina’s
advantage to observe the effect of such statutes in practice in other
states before deciding whether to adopt one itself.
Though this argument fails to explain why the general assembly
still has not ratified a constituency statute over thirty years after the
nation’s first one was passed, it may explain the house of
representatives’ reluctance to pass the recent North Carolina Benefit
Corporation Act, a type of legislation that has only been in existence
for five years.179 However, by limiting both the scope of its directors’
power and the types of business associations it allows to organize in
the state, North Carolina may be constraining its corporations in a
way that could negatively impact the state’s economy in the not-sodistant future by forcing some of these companies to take their
business elsewhere.

176. Les Christie, 10 Fastest Growing U.S. Cities, CNN MONEY (Apr. 5, 2012, 12:42 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/real_estate/1204/gallery.US-Cities/ [http://perma.cc/U2VTADNY].
177. Standley, supra note 5, at 217.
178. Id.
179. Shortly after the bill was voted on, Sen. Tim Moore of Cleveland County
expressed concerns about benefit corporation legislation, which many states have been
quick to adopt. “The bottom line is, you don’t need a B-corp.” Leslie, supra note 159.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATE LAW
GOING FORWARD
A. Adopt the North Carolina Benefit Corporation Act
It is imperative that North Carolina recognize the advantages of
the newest major corporate law reform and ratify a benefit
corporation act. It is of course true that doing so would not provide
any clarity as to whether directors of traditional business corporations
are allowed to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituents,
like a constituency statute would. However, it would provide an
attractive alternative business organization option, both for
entrepreneurs who want to start a company that strives to make a
profit while “be[ing] about good things” and for existing companies
willing to commit themselves to a higher standard of social
accountability.180
In just five years, twenty-seven jurisdictions have adopted benefit
corporation acts.181 Though benefit corporations are still very new,
they have already proven to be a viable business form under which a
company can satisfy the interests of both its shareholders and
stakeholders. For example, Patagonia, a well-known outdoor-clothing
company incorporated in California, amended its articles of
incorporation to become a benefit corporation just two days after the
California Benefit Corporation Act became effective in January of
2012.182 Patagonia’s founder, Yvon Chouinard, is known for his
environmental philanthropy, and the company had been redirecting a
portion of its profits to social and environmental causes since 1986,
despite being classified as an ordinary business corporation.183
However, by establishing itself as a benefit corporation, the company
charged its directors with a “legally binding fiduciary responsibility to
take into account the interests of workers, the community and the
environment as well as its shareholders,” thus “creat[ing] the legal
framework” necessary for Patagonia to “remain true to [its] social
goals.”184 Furthermore, despite Patagonia’s revamped commitment to
the environment and other nonshareholder constituents, it has
180. See Leslie, supra note 159; see also Surowiecki, supra note 109.
181. State by State Legislative Status, supra note 115.
182. B Corps: Firms with Benefits, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.economist
.com/node/21542432 [http://perma.cc/CK3S-Q9WR].
183. See Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Status, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2012, 7:57
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests-new-sustainabilitylegal-status.html [http://perma.cc/Z836-3GDR].
184. B Corps: Firms with Benefits, supra note 182.
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managed to remain extremely profitable.185 In fact, since 2008, the
company has doubled in size and its profits have tripled.186 Though
benefit corporation acts are still in their adolescence, the success of a
reputable company like Patagonia suggests that benefit corporations
may very well be able to achieve both their social and economic goals
by carrying out their established benefit purposes while still managing
to produce a healthy bottom line.
Another important reason for North Carolina to ratify a benefit
corporation act is that it will allow the state’s corporations to “attract
and retain talented employees” who “want to work for socially
conscious companies, and will take less compensation in exchange for
a greater sense of purpose.”187 In the past, recent college graduates
who fit this description have often been inclined to work at
nonprofits.188 However, because the “ability to have an impact on a
large scale is . . . greater in the for-profit world,” allowing benefit
corporations will likely provide a more attractive option for these
highly qualified workers, thus leading to a more competent and
efficient work force.189 Similarly, the fact that a company has made a
commitment to a noble social or environmental cause can be “an
important selling point with consumers,” thus encouraging them to
give their business to, or invest in, companies that they otherwise
would not have.190 Much like benefit corporation investors, who are
willing to potentially sacrifice a portion of profits, many consumers
are willing to pay slightly more for goods and services provided by
socially and environmentally responsible corporations because they
realize that doing so will help further social causes.191
In short, adopting a benefit corporation act in North Carolina
will likely result in both a more efficient supply chain and increased
consumer demand.192 By creating a sustainable model in which a
corporation makes a commitment to conduct its business for the
benefit of its shareholders, as well as its employees and the

185. See Drake Baer, How Patagonia’s New CEO Is Increasing Profits While Trying To
Save the World, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 28, 2014, 5:44 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com
/3026713/lessons-learned/how-patagonias-new-ceo-is-increasing-profits-while-trying-tosave-the-world [http://perma.cc/YEC5-B4MD].
186. Id.
187. Sorowiecki, supra note 109.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
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environment, companies like Patagonia have blazed the trail for
socially conscious corporations with similar aspirations.
One final reason to pass a benefit corporation act in North
Carolina is that it would provide both the courts and the would-be
directors of benefit corporations with substantial legal clarity. By
creating a duty that requires benefit corporation directors to consider
nonshareholder constituents, benefit corporation acts make clear that
a company is bound to uphold its stated benefit purposes even “when
times get tough.”193 Furthermore, by providing shareholders with
clearly defined and enforceable legal rights, benefit corporation acts
establish an important check on the board’s power that assures this
important duty will be followed.194 In turn, the unambiguous
provisions of benefit corporation acts leave little room for alternative
interpretation, foreseeably easing the North Carolina courts’ burden
should they be required to interpret the meaning of the statute in
future litigation.195
Though the North Carolina General Assembly has thus far
declined to adopt a benefit corporation act, there is still hope for
ratification of such a statute in the near future. After rejecting the
proposed legislation in May of 2013, the house of representatives
immediately decided to resurrect the bill by reversing the vote on a
motion for reconsideration by Sen. Tim Moore.196 The bill has since
been referred again to the house commerce committee for further
consideration.197 Passing the bill would create a new type of legal
business association with mandatory director duties and clearly
defined shareholder rights of enforcement.198 In addition, it would
foster a more efficient economy with a highly qualified workforce that

193. Id.
194. See Hasler, supra note 116, at 1319.
195. For example, the proposed North Carolina Benefit Corporation Act from 2013
clearly defines directors’ duties and shareholder right of action, neither of which are
defined in constituency statutes. Under the proposed North Carolina Benefit Corporation
Act, directors shall consider the following constituents’ interests and company objectives:
(1) shareholders, (2) employees, (3) customers, (4) the community and society, (5) the
local and global environment, (6) the short- and long-term interests of the benefit
corporation, and (7) the company’s general and specific public benefit purpose. H.B. 440,
2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (defining directors’ duties under proposed
statute N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18-40(a)). Furthermore, the proposed North Carolina
General Statute section 55-18-43 gives shareholders, directors, and equity holders the right
to enforce these required director duties through a “benefit enforcement proceeding.” Id.
196. Leslie, supra note 159.
197. H.B. 440, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts
/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=h440 [http://perma.cc/R7SZ-PV2T].
198. See H.B. 440 § 55-18-40, -41, -43.
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would allow benefit corporations to appease shareholder and
nonshareholder constituents alike.
B.

Enact a Constituency Statute

Though adopting a benefit corporation act would prove valuable
to North Carolina in many ways, doing so would not solve the
corporate identity conflict in the context of traditional business
corporations. Because North Carolina has yet to adopt a constituency
statute and the case law fails to clearly fill the statutory gap, one can
only assume that the state still conforms to the traditionalist
“property” school of thought.199 Accordingly, the shareholder primacy
theory requires directors of North Carolina corporations to operate in
a way that maximizes shareholder profits and considers only the best
interests of a corporation’s owners.200
The current traditionalist theory of corporate identity can deter a
socially conscious business from incorporating in the state and
prevent current North Carolina corporations from fully developing
their “moral identity.”201 The first major benefit of adopting a
constituency statute is that it would remove the burden caused by a
North Carolina corporation director’s duty to maximize shareholder
profit, instead allowing directors to make decisions that benefit the
corporation as a whole.202 While in actuality directors probably
manage to escape liability for decisions that involve the consideration
of nonshareholder interests on a fairly regular basis,203 the fact
remains that, under current North Carolina law, such actions
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty for which the shareholders are
legally entitled to sue.204 Adopting a constituency statute in North
Carolina would provide explicit immunity for directors of nonbenefit
corporations, thus encouraging open and consistent consideration of
stakeholder interests as part of the board’s decision-making

199. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307–08, 307 S.E.2d 551, 568–69 (1983)
(explaining that a corporate officer holds a fiduciary duty to perform on behalf of the
corporation and its stockholders).
200. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-11075, 2001 WL
1885686, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001); Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1090;
Orts, supra note 13, at 90.
201. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1109.
202. Id. at 1101.
203. See Standley, supra note 5, at 220–21 (discussing how the business judgment rule
“serves as a backstop for directors contemplating a variety of interests,” creating a
presumption in favor of the board and making it more difficult for a shareholder to prevail
on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty).
204. See Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 307, 307 S.E.2d at 568.

94 N.C. L. REV. 686 (2016)

2015]

CORPORATE IDENTITY THEORY

719

process.205 And without such liability on a corporation’s directors, the
corporation can develop a strong “moral identity” within its
community and uphold what many consider to be its implied ethical
obligations.206
Another significant benefit of adopting a constituency statute is
that its adoption would make North Carolina’s corporate law more
consistent with the modern theory of the corporation in the United
States, as exemplified by corporate law trends in a vast majority of the
states.207 By allowing directors to formally recognize the interests of
all those who sustain the corporation through important noncapital
investments, North Carolina would be “recogniz[ing] both the
inextricable interdependence of corporate actors and the desirability
of treating participants in a common enterprise as if they share
common goals, rather than placing them in selfish competition with
one another.”208 In doing so, the general assembly would align the
state’s corporate law with the modern constructionist theory of
corporate identity embraced by nearly all other states.209
Further, operating under the constructionist theory and
considering the interests of the corporate entity as a whole rather
than just those of the shareholders would allow directors to maximize
the long-term wealth-producing value of the firm.210 The fact that an

205. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1101.
206. See id. at 1108.
207. See Standley, supra note 5, at 212.
208. Mitchell, supra note 95, at 642–43.
209. Standley, supra note 5, at 212 (emphasizing that forty-one states have adopted
constituency statutes, which reject the traditionalist theory by “enabl[ing] corporate
directors to consider interests other than those of their shareholders when exercising their
corporate decision-making authority”).
210. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1105 (arguing that modern corporate
directors must consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders to ensure the best result
for society overall). The stark contrast between pure shareholder profit maximization and
long-term company value maximization is perfectly exemplified by IBM, one of the
United States’ most iconic companies. At the company’s peak in the 1980s, there were
over 10,000 IBM employees working and living in Endicott, New York. Now, just thirty
years later, only 700 IBM employees remain in Endicott. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing
Shareholder Value: The Goal that Changed Corporate America, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/maximizing-shareholder-value-thegoal-that-changed-corporate-america/2013/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d
_story.html [http://perma.cc/WVT2-8QRC]. Continuous pressure on the board to
maximize shareholder profits has forced the company to implement sizeable layoffs and to
export much of its manufacturing work overseas. Id. The company has also made
significant cuts in its pension and retirement plans. Id. However, the company’s job cuts
and benefits alterations have resulted in a twenty-five-fold return in stock value since
1980. Id. The trend at IBM over the past thirty years shows a shift from a constructionistminded model in which constituents’ (like employees’) interests were a major
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investor’s shares in a company are almost always freely transferable
means that the general interests of the corporation’s shareholders will
frequently change, depending upon the age and level of risk aversion
of the particular shareholders at any given time.211 Because “[a]
corporation is an entity whose interests will generally remain the
same over an extended period of time . . . a more consistent result will
come from pursuing the goals of a corporate entity rather than
seeking to satisfy the constantly changing, volatile goals of
shareholders.”212
In summary, adopting a constituency statute in North Carolina
would “attract socially responsible businesses” not already
incorporated in the state213 and would provide directors of those that
are with the legal immunity necessary to consider nonshareholder
interests more openly and consistently.214 The ratification of a
constituency statute would also make the state’s body of corporate
law more consistent with the modern theory of the corporation.215
Current North Carolina corporate law seemingly fails to recognize the
value of the nonfinancial investments that stakeholders make in a
company, instead placing all the value on the capital investments
provided by its shareholders.216 Many scholars like Edward Adams
and John Matheson, both business law professors at the University of
Minnesota School of Law, refute this theory of the corporation,
asserting that nonshareholder constituents, like employees, actually
“may have made a much greater investment in the enterprise by their
years of service, may have less ability to withdraw, and may have a
greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the
stockholders.”217 Adopting a constituency statute in North Carolina
would allow directors to recognize the interests of all those invested
in the corporation and would lead to a more efficient and cooperative
corporate model.218
consideration to a traditionalist model strictly focused on delivering the highest possible
returns to shareholders. Id.
211. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1106.
212. Id. at 1106–07.
213. Bisconti, supra note 21, at 786.
214. See Standley, supra note 5, at 219–21 (explaining that, in states without
constituency statutes, boards are still bound by the common law duty to manage the
company with shareholder interests as the primary consideration).
215. See id. at 212.
216. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 308, 307 S.E.2d 551, 568 (1983)
(noting that corporate officers and directors “stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders”).
217. Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1102.
218. See id. at 1105.
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CONCLUSION
Corporate identity theory has come a long way since the early
1920s, when state courts consistently held that directors’ sole duty was
to maximize shareholder profits, even if doing so was to the detriment
of other stakeholders’ interests.219 Since then, many states have
abandoned the outdated, traditionalist shareholder primacy model in
favor of an all-inclusive, constructionist corporate identity theory
through the passage of socially progressive corporate law
legislation.220 In doing so, these states have responded to the need for
a more equitable corporate model that considers the interest of all
parties who have made investments in a corporation, whether
financial or otherwise.221 It is time for North Carolina to follow this
trend and pass some progressive corporate laws of its own.
Enacting a benefit corporation act would encourage socially and
environmentally responsible corporations to incorporate in the state.
These corporations would then be able to attract and retain young,
talented employees who are determined to pursue careers that will
make a difference in the world, as well as socially conscious
consumers who are committed to supporting these companies’
beneficial purposes. A benefit corporation act would also provide
substantial legal clarity to the directors of benefit corporations and
enable them to hold corporations to higher social standards.
Additionally, adopting a constituency statute would permit
directors of nonbenefit corporations to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituents by freeing them from legal liability for
failure to maximize shareholder profits. By embracing the
constructionist corporate model, a constituency statute in North
Carolina would allow directors to maximize the long-term wealthproducing value of the corporation by recognizing the important
nonfinancial investments made by a corporation’s many stakeholders.
While the objective of a for-profit corporation is ultimately to
have a healthy bottom line, directors should not be forced to
completely disregard the interests of nonshareholder constituents in
pursuit of that goal. Allowing for benefit corporations and providing
directors of nonbenefit corporations with the ability to consider
stakeholder interests would lead to a more efficient economy in

219. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”).
220. Standley, supra note 5, at 212.
221. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 6, at 1105.
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North Carolina and would make North Carolina corporate law much
more consistent with the prevailing modern theory of the corporation.
It is time the state steps into the future by abandoning the
traditionalist school of thought and joining the constructionist reform
movement.
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